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Waynesburg, PA 15370, USA 
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ABSTRACT 
The article analyses the relationship between the Anglican Church of Rwanda 
and evangelical Episcopalians in the United States. In 2000, the archbishop of 
Rwanda, Emmanuel Kolini, in a move that gained great support for Rwanda's 
post-genocide recovery, ordained several bishops to preside over congregations 
of orthodox, evangelical Americans who had severed their relationship with the 
Episcopalian Church of the United States over issues such as the blessing of same- 
sex marriages and the ordination of openly gay clergy. The result was the creation 
of the Anglican Mission in the Americas, a missionary province in the United 
States that acknowledges Kolini as its archbishop. Such actions have made 
Rwanda the current cause cdlbre not only of AMIA but the wider evangelical 
community. While the relationship offers great support for Rwanda's recovery, 
the Anglican Church has presented to American evangelicals a misleading nar- 
rative of Rwanda's past and present political situation. 
INTRODUCTION 
On 25July 2004, the president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, appeared before 
a crowd of several thousand people in Ruhengeri to offer his remarks on the 
completion of a new Anglican cathedral. The dedication of the cathedral 
was the culmination of a five-day evangelistic crusade sponsored by the 
Shyira Diocese of the 'Province de l'Eglise Episcopale au Rwanda' (PEER). 
The crusade, and the subsequent dedication ceremony, were attended by 
an estimated 5,ooo Rwandans, Anglican bishops and clergy from across 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and a much smaller contingent of 
Episcopalians from the United States. 
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Among the Americans in attendance were four priests of an alternative 
Episcopalian province known as the Anglican Mission in the Americas 
(AMIA). The AMIA pastors were there as special guests of their archbishop, 
the Reverend Emmanuel Kolini, bishop of Kigali Diocese and archbishop 
of PEER. The presence of the AMIA pastors, honoured guests throughout 
the crusade, was the culmination of Kolini's efforts to promote post- 
genocide recovery in Rwanda by welding together PEER with evangelical, 
orthodox Americans who had severed their communion with the 
Episcopalian Church of the United States (ECUSA). 
On various occasions, the AMIA pastors were invited to address the 
crowd and lead workshops on various topics for the Rwandan par- 
ishioners. In his closing address at the dedication of the cathedral, Kolini 
declared the AMIA attendees 'part and parcel of the Church of Rwanda, 
his spiritual children, indeed Rwandese living in America s missionaries'. 
During the dedication, the most senior of the AMIA clergymen was invited 
into the cathedral, along with President Kagame, to take part in the 
prayers of consecration.' 
Coming ten years to the month after the end of the Rwandan genocide 
of 1994 and the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the cru- 
sade and dedication of the cathedral reveal much about Rwanda's efforts 
to recover from the genocide. The crusade itself was illustrative of the 
role of the Anglican Church in seeking international id to promote rec- 
onciliation, recovery and development. In addition, Kolini's embrace of 
disaffected Episcopalians in the United States has made Rwanda the 
current cause chilbre of American evangelicals, holding forth great potential 
for developmental resources for Rwanda's recovery. The support of the 
AMIA churches, numbering over one hundred by 2007, has aided greatly 
in Rwanda's reconstruction, even while its existence indicates the turmoil 
that American Episcopalians have experienced in recent years over the 
Church's growing acceptance of homosexual practices. Indeed, the con- 
struction of the new cathedral in Ruhengeri was financed in part by 
wealthy donors from an AMIA church in Alabama. 
Yet, despite the close relationship between American evangelicals and 
Rwandan Anglicans, and despite the genuine efforts made by both towards 
reconstruction, the evidence suggests that PEER is a politicised 'Tutsi' 
church, to the detriment of its own efforts at reconciliation as well as 
AMIA's support of those efforts. This article takes as its thesis that the 
Anglican Church leaders of Rwanda have elicited great support from 
AMIA and the wider evangelical community inAmerica, even while taking 
part in the Rwandan Patriotic Front's (RPF) campaign to confirm its legi- 
timacy by obfuscating Rwanda's, and its own, complex history. A politicised 
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and misleading narrative of Rwanda's past, supported by PEER, has drawn 
AMIA and its well-financed supporters into embracing a country that has 
many social and political barriers to overcome. Moreover, the church's 
relationship to Kagame's regime has disturbing parallels to the Catholic, 
and Protestant, Church's relationship to the pre-genocide government. 
THE POLITICISATION OF THE POST-INDEPENDENCE CHURCH 
In 1959, the last Tutsi king of Rwanda, Mwami Mutara, died suddenly, 
sparking an internal revolution in which Hutu rebels attacked the mon- 
archy, sending thousands of Tutsis into Uganda, Burundi and the Belgian 
Congo. As Belgium relinquished its colonies, elections were held in July 
1960, yielding a landslide victory for Gregoire Kayibanda and his anti- 
Tutsi Parti du Movement del'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), widely 
accused of inciting violence against Tutsis in the name of 'Hutu Power'. 
Formal independence was granted on IJuly 1961, and Rwanda became an 
independent republic with Kayibanda as president. 
By the time it achieved independence, Rwanda was a thoroughly 
Christianised country. Catholicism arrived first, in 1900, through the efforts 
of BishopJean-Joseph Hirth of the Missionnaires d'Afrique or 'White Fathers', 
and spread rapidly among both the Hutu populace and the ruling Tutsi 
elites. In 1930, the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) established 
its first mission station at Ruhengeri and the surrounding Shyira Diocese 
became the first Anglican Province of Rwanda. By the 1940s, both the 
Anglicans and the Seventh-Day Adventists had attracted significant 
numbers of converts, though Catholicism remained the majority Church 
throughout the period before independence and after. 
Throughout the colonial era, the Belgian authorities afforded a privi- 
leged position to the Tutsis, whom they viewed as the natural rulers of 
Rwanda, going so far as to issue identity cards that specified Rwandans 
as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.2 While the Catholic Church, in addition to the 
Anglicans and virtually all of the others, initially supported such policies, it 
changed course prior to independence and started promoting Hutus to 
clerical positions as a means of advancing social justice. 
When the 1959 Revolution began, the Church supported Kayibanda's 
regime and acquiesced in the expulsion of the Tutsis. Moreover, most 
Tutsis were forced out of government positions, yet continued their pre- 
dominance in the ranks of the upper hierarchy of the Catholic Church; 
while Bishop Perraudin was white, Bishop Bigirumwami was Tutsi. The 
last Tutsi bishop,Jean-Baptiste Gahamanyi, was appointed in 1961. There- 
after, and until after the genocide, all appointments were Hutu. Saskia van 
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Hoyweghen (1996: 382) estimates that, by the time of the genocide, 90 % 
of the Christian population was Hutu, while 70 % of the lower clergy were 
Tutsi and most bishops were Hutu. In this sense, 'the Church was pene- 
trated by society and faced difficulties in becoming an independent in- 
stitution with control over its flock'. 
In 1973, General Juvenal Habyarimana led a successful coup against 
Kayibanda, at a time when Tutsi pogroms were rampant across the 
country (Hoyweghen 1996). Initially, Habyarimana's regime promised 
reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi, leading to a reduction in ethnic 
tensions and promoting considerable development for the country 
(Mamdani 2001). Despite this, however, the new regime marked the be- 
ginning of a complete church-state symbiosis. Health care and education 
were left o the Church, yet subject to political control, such as the main- 
tenance of an ethnic quota system in clerical promotions (Hoyweghen 
1996: 383). Moreover, Vincent Nsengiyumva, rchbishop of the Catholic 
Church, was a member of Habyarimana's inner circle and occupied a seat 
on the committee of the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour la Democratie 
(MRND), the ruling party. Leaders of the Anglican, Presbyterian and 
Baptist Churches were also closely allied with the regime, and local pastors 
and priests were allied with local burgomasters and councillors (Longman 
2o001). 
In the late I98Os, as the social and economic forces that led to the 
genocide unfolded, the Church was largely silent. There was no reaction 
in i990, for instance, when Sylvio Sindambiwe, a writer with the Catholic 
journal Kinyameteka, was murdered for speaking out against corruption 
(Hoyweghen 1996). Several Tutsi priests were arrested in the aftermath as
well. Hoyweghen (1996: 385-6) argues that the church was 'mute' and did 
not question 'the political structures in which it comfortably operated'. 
While several church organisations were critical of Habyarimana's new 
course, the senior clergy, allied with the regime, 'had no eye for social 
justice nor the oppression of its own Tutsi clergy'. 
When the genocide began in April 1994, the church remained silent and 
even cooperative in the face of its own destruction. The first place attacked 
was the Centre Christus in Kigali, where the Hutu priests and laity were 
spared while the Tutsi priests were killed, along with a group of visiting 
Tutsi schoolgirls. Reports abounded from across Rwanda of both Catholic 
and Protestant clergy who stepped aside to allow the interahamwe militias to 
massacre their Tutsi parishioners hiding in the churches, in some cases 
hiding there because they were invited in by their priests. African Rights 
reported that more Rwandans died in churches than anywhere else 
(Longman 2oo0). 
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By the time the genocidal spree was over, the Catholic Church had 
lost, in addition to its credibility, roughly half of its priests. Hoyweghen 
reports that by the summer of 1995 only 200 or so priests were left in 
Rwanda out of a total of nearly 400, the rest either dead or hiding in 
refugee camps. In June 1995, Nsengiyumva and two other bishops were 
killed in retribution for the genocide. Hoyweghen (1996: 395) describes the 
post-genocide Catholic Church as 'de facto beheaded' and 'in a state of 
shock'. 
THE UGANDAN ORIGINS OF THE POST-GENOCIDE ANGLICAN 
CHURCH 
In these chaotic ircumstances Paul Kagame's RPF and its military arm, the 
RPA, intensified the military campaign started in 1990, intent on ending 
the genocide and ousting the remnants of Habyarimana's government. 
Kagame's forces comprised Tutsi exiles, many of whom had lived most, 
if not all, of their lives in Uganda. During the 1959 Revolution, and in 
subsequent waves in the years afterward, tens of thousands of persecuted 
Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries. The majority of these refugees, de- 
scribed as the '59ers', took up residence in southern Uganda, where they 
had a close relationship with the indigenous Banyarwanda and related 
Ankole peoples (Otunnu 1999a). There, they formed the core of a Tutsi 
refugee community who continually sought the right of return to what 
they saw as their homeland (Waugh 2004). 
Much of the post-genocide church hierarchy in Rwanda, which sup- 
ports the image of the Tutsi returnees as suffering refugees seeking only to 
return home, obscures both the complex role played by the Tutsi exiles in 
Uganda's turbulent political history, and the citizenship crisis that engulfed 
the region in the late I980s. Throughout the period of the first Milton 
Obote government and Idi Amin's subsequent era, the '59ers' were 
frequently viewed as meddlesome outsiders who had overstayed their 
welcome. Initially, the Tutsi refugees were welcomed, but as it became 
apparent that they would remain in the country indefinitely, 'hospitality 
fatigue set in and generosity turned into hostility' (Otunnu I999a). In 1980, 
when Obote gained power a second time, numerous Tutsi refugees, led by 
Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, joined Yoweri Museveni and the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) in their struggle against Obote's 
Uganda People's Congress (UPC).3 
With Museveni's victory in 1986, Tutsi leaders, among them Rwigyema 
and Kagame, formed the RPF/RPA in 1987 as a unit of the NRA to assist 
in putting down counter-insurgencies in eastern and northern Uganda 
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(Otunnu I999b). While participation in the NRA's struggle allowed the 
RPF to recruit many more refugees and perfect their military skills, the 
effect for Museveni of his alliance with the '59ers' was to greatly heighten 
anti-Tutsi feelings among the Ugandan populace (Pottier 2002). By 
1989, Rwigyema was second only to Museveni n the military hierarchy of 
the NRA, and many other Tutsis had obtained key political, military and 
economic posts (Waugh 2004). Otunnu (1999a) documents that the in- 
creased presence of the Tutsi refugees tended to confirm the claim that the 
NRA itself was a 'Tutsi organisation' and that Museveni's political op- 
ponents frequently referred to him as a 'Rwandese refugee'. 
By 1990, the large Tutsi presence in the NRA and elsewhere in Uganda 
presented Museveni with a significant political problem, the outcome of 
which has generally been termed the 'citizenship crisis'. When Museveni 
gained power, the NRA's opponents demanded that indigenous Ugandans 
receive priority in the new state. To resolve the question of who was 
indigenous, and thus who was a citizen, the NRA made a distinction 
between residents and non-residents. Mamdani (2001) argues that the 1990 
'squatter uprising' over land entitlements compelled Museveni, who had 
already removed Rwigyema and other non-citizen '59ers' from their po- 
sitions, to clarify that only indigenous Ugandans were entitled to state 
land, to the exclusion of the Banyarwandan Tutsi refugees.4 
Prior to Museveni's 1990 clarification fcitizenship, which excluded the 
Tutsi refugees, many of them had been content o become naturalised 
Ugandans. Initially, inJuly 1986, Museveni declared that any Banyarwanda 
who was resident for ten or more years would be entitled to citizenship. 
But with his change of course in 1990, and the realisation that they would 
have neither land nor political power in Uganda, the refugee community 
concluded that they would have no future unless they returned to 
Rwanda. It was thus with Museveni's perceived political betrayal as well as 
logistical support that the initial 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda began, 
which culminated in 1994 in the midst of the genocide. 
The complexities and nature of the RPF's involvement in Ugandan 
politics as well as the 'citizenship crisis' in Uganda and the wider Great 
Lakes Region are not spoken of by PEER, and its AMIA supporters re- 
main largely oblivious to these issues as well. The narrative that generally 
persists in AMIA and the wider American evangelical community, a nar- 
rative neither efuted nor challenged by PEER, is that Kagame and the 
RPF invaded Rwanda only to stop the genocide and rebuild the country. 
Such ignorance allows many of Rwanda's supporters to picture themselves 
as coming along behind a benevolent RPF to rescue the country from its 
underdevelopment and help in its recovery, without having to face the 
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RPF's history or the larger political issues at stake for Rwanda and the 
region. 
The ousting of Habyarimana's regime in July 1994, and the coming to 
power of the RPF, marks the beginning of the current phase of Rwanda's 
history. There followed a period of stabilisation a d an effort to reconstruct 
a new civil society, supposedly inclusive of all Rwandans. Ethnic identity 
cards were abolished and the RPF affirmed its commitment tothe Arusha 
Accords and a government based on power-sharing. Moreover, many 
'friends of the new Rwanda' in the United States, the UK and the 
Netherlands, burdened by guilt, saw the RPF as the 'good guys' (Ryentjens 
2004). Foreign aid began flowing and numerous dignitaries made their 
pilgrimage to Rwanda to apologise for not doing more to stop the genocide. 
The victory of the RPF also opened the way for many Tutsi exiles, first 
and second generation refugees from the conflicts of 1959 to 1973, to return 
to the country. The return of the refugees, estimated at 8oo,ooo, marks the 
most significant social change for Rwanda's post-genocide history. 
Chukwuma Obidegwu (2003: 11), the lead economist for Poverty 
Reduction and Debt Management for the World Bank, notes that the 
return of the Tutsi diaspora signifies a replacement of the 'old elite, most 
of whom fled into exile, by a new elite that consisted mostly of English- 
speaking returnees from Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. English was 
adopted as an official language, facilitating the transition for the returnees 
as well as the work of international NGOs and donors from the English- 
speaking world.' 
Among the new elite were numerous Anglican clergymen who returned 
to rebuild the church and join in the effort to promote reconciliation a d 
recovery. Many of them came back to Rwanda after years of exile abroad, 
and have capitalised on the virtual destruction of the pre-genocide 
Christian church to build a new institution, one that shares a close align- 
ment with the new Rwandan state. Virtually all of the Anglican pastors 
with whom this author spoke in 2004 were raised in Uganda and returned 
in the wake of the genocide. Educated in Uganda, they speak English as a 
primary language, and Kinyarwanda as a second language, if at all. 
Moreover, as the Tutsi exiles generally held the Catholic Church as pri- 
marily responsible for the 1959 Revolution, they viewed it with hostility 
and by and large adopted Anglicanism.5 
Key figures in the Anglican hierarchy are also Tutsi returnees. In 1996, 
the Anglican Consultative Council instituted a new church hierarchy to 
replace the leadership lost during the genocide. While much of the blame 
for the genocide centres on the Catholic Church, the Anglican hierarchy 
was just as culpable. The Anglican bishops of the Kigali and Shyira 
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dioceses were both vocal in their support of Habyarimana's regime and 
were thus forced out of office after the RPF takeover. 
The present archbishop, Emmanuel Kolini, was born in Zaire and 
came of age in Uganda, where he attended seminary and served as priest 
and headmaster of several refugee schools. Kolini, who has extensive 
contacts in the United States, became bishop of Kigali Diocese and 
archbishop of PEER in 1997. Second only to Kolini in his prominence 
among American Episcopalians is Bishop John Rucyahana. A Tutsi exile 
in 1959, Rucyahana grew up in Uganda where he served as a priest until 
1997 when he was named bishop of the Shyira Diocese. A similar story 
holds for several other bishops and executive officials of the church. Most 
recently, on 29 November 2005, Pastor Emmanuel Gatera, a professor 
from Mukono University in Uganda, was appointed provincial secretary 
of the church and acts as a liaison between PEER and AMIA. 
The Ugandan origins of the Anglican hierarchy present several barriers 
to the church being an effective mouthpiece for reconciliation a d political 
inclusiveness. Apart from its clear association with the RPF, PEER is es- 
sentially a Tutsi organisation. While church leaders and pastors repeatedly 
refer to themselves as 'Rwandan', the Hutu populace, still poor and 
without access to power, continue to see the ruling elites, in both church 
and state, as Tutsi. Mamdani (2001) confirms that even moderate oppo- 
nents of the RPF complain that not only are the structures of power in 
Rwanda being Tutsified, but even civic bodies such as the media and non- 
governmental organisations are being cleansed of any but a nominal Hutu 
presence. The author's research and observations confirm that PEER is 
no exception. Based on numerous conversations the author had in 2004 
with people unaffiliated with the church, contemporary Rwandans are 
acutely aware of the identity of the new rulers. 
Moreover, the very prevalence of English in church functions serves as a 
perpetual reminder of this. Most of the ruling elites in both the govern- 
ment and church, raised in anglophone Uganda, speak French as a third 
language, if at all. Given that most Rwandans speak French as a co- 
language, this in itself presents a barrier to the church's programme of 
reconciliation. Despite Anglicanism's long history in the country, the use 
of English in many church functions reminds Rwandans that PEER, in its 
present form, is essentially an outside institution, fostered in Uganda. 
Considering both the importance of language in creating a sense of 
identity and the primacy of the church in African civil society, this is not a 
minor hurdle in Rwanda's road to overcoming the ethnic divisions of the 
past. PEER's present association with high-profile American supporters 
also supports the use of English. 
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Nonetheless, the church has, in its rhetoric, attempted to reach beyond 
its Tutsi identity to promote unity and reconciliation under the banner of 
Rwanda's long Christian heritage. Thus, the church has tried to recall the 
spirit and practices of the charismatic East African Revival Movement of 
the 1930s. Central to this is the Biblical, and widespread African, belief in 
prophecy.6 The church claims that a divinely inspired prophecy has been 
issued for Rwanda, asserting that the country will be 'a model of rec- 
onciliation and recovery and that the wider world will look in awe upon 
the ability of Rwandans to heal from the genocide'. The prophecy, prin- 
ted in the programme guide for the Ruhengeri crusade (PEER 2002), 
further claims that 'Rwanda will become the source of a "Spiritual 
Renaissance" for the world. The revelation to His [God's] servants was 
that Rwanda would be united and reconciled to such an extent that the 
whole world would marvel. This has inspired them to search after the 
God of the impossible.' The crusade literature also expressed the hope 
that fulfilment of the 'Divine Prophecy' would be realised and claimed 
that Rwanda's destiny was 'Pardon for sins for those who confess' (pre- 
sumably genocide perpetrators), in addition to 'protection against curses, 
plagues, poverty and famine' (PEER 2004). 
The programme cites the Biblical prophet Zechariah as its authority; 
specifically, chapter 8, verses 22-23, which reads, 'Many peoples and 
strong nations shall come to seek the Lord of hosts in Jerusalem, and to 
entreat the favour of the Lord. Thus says the Lord of hosts: In those days 
ten men from the nations of every tongue shall take hold of the robe of a 
Jew, saying, "Let us go with you, for we have heard that God is with you"' 
(ibid.; Bible translation from the Revised Standard Version). Symbolically, 
for evangelical Christians, the 'Jew' spoken of in the passage is a reference 
to Christ himself, in whom forgiveness and reconciliation can be found. 
When the passage speaks of 'men from every tongue' taking hold of 
Christ, the implicit message is that only Christ can overcome the divisions 
wrought by the genocide. The very theme of the crusade was 'We Wish to 
See Jesus'. 
In its very Christ-centred approach, the prophecy elicits great attention 
from both Rwandan Christians and American evangelicals. Considering 
the history of northwest Rwanda and Ruhengeri as the starting point for 
the East African Revival, divine prophecy has deep cultural roots.' The 
Anglicans of Rwanda, while far from being Pentecostal, accept charis- 
matic practices, including prophecy, healing and speaking in tongues, all 
under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Such was communicated to the 
author by Diocesan Secretary Nathan Amooti, who translated the sermons 
at the Ruhengeri Crusade from English to Kinyarwanda and vice versa. 
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Both languages were used interchangeably during the crusade and speak 
to the fact that the present Anglican hierarchy is generally fluent only in 
English and Kinyarwanda, while the majority of their Hutu parishioners 
speak French or Kinyarwanda. Amooti also serves as Archbishop Kolini's 
assistant, and travels frequently in the United States visiting AMIA con- 
gregations, many of whom also accept charismatic practices.s 
Given the crusade's location in Ruhengeri, the prophecy, with its divine 
exhortation for reconciliation, carries considerable weight. The 1959-63 
violence against Tutsis was especially widespread in the North, and 
Habyarimana himself was from a traditionally northern lineage, as was the 
establishment hat was responsible for the genocide. Large-scale massacres 
also took place in the region in the years from 1990-93 (Uvin 1997). Thus, 
the area was home to many genocide perpetrators, and the author was 
told that there were many former ginocidaires in attendance at the crusade. 
The Anglican Church is attempting to promote spiritual reconciliation 
and unification under the banner of the country's Christian heritage. By 
exhorting Rwandans to find their identification in Christ, the church 
tries to offer a powerful, constructivist mechanism for rebuilding society 
and overcoming the deep divisions that still plague the country. In the 
language of political science, the constructivist approach to nation-building 
is explained as being that of offering individuals a sense of identity, con- 
structed largely unconsciously or intuitively as a category of understand- 
ing. This suggests that institutional arrangements which an individual 
inhabits may become the defining categories of political understanding 
concerning their identity, interests and goals (Brown 2000). 
This approach suggests that the church in Rwanda is trying to position 
itself to play a constructive role in recovering from the genocide by de- 
fining a new sense of national identity rooted in Christianity. Yet, because 
of its close alignment with the ruling RPF, the church has allowed itself to 
become a political mouthpiece for the regime. A case in point is its un- 
willingness to call attention to the many human rights violations committed 
by the RPA. For example, while it was pointed out to the AMIA attendees 
at the Ruhengeri Crusade that the area was home to many genocide 
perpetrators, no mention was made of the fact that the RPA killed thou- 
sands of civilians in northwest Rwanda betweenJanuary and August 1997, 
and further, in 1999, hundreds of thousands of civilians in Gisenyi and 
Ruhengeri were forcibly relocated to 'deplorable' regroupment camps 
(Reyntjens 2004). 
American evangelicals, largely unaware of such crimes, are attracted 
very strongly to PEER's efforts, and see such actions as a divinely inspired 
opportunity to join in and support the rebuilding of Rwanda with a 
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Christ-centred message. Kolini himself has become one of the central 
figures in the battle between Anglican progressives and traditionalists. In 
so doing, he has attracted considerable attention and resources for devel- 
opment from orthodox Episcopalians in the United States, even while his 
church keeps its American congregants in the dark about Rwanda's 
complex history and socio-political issues. 
'A SPIRITUAL GENOCIDE OF THE TRUTH':THE HOMOSEXUAL 
DIVIDE 
Soon after their ordination as bishops, Kolini and Rucyahana attended 
the 1998 Lambeth Conference of the world-wide Anglican Communion, 
held every ten years to address matters of faith and doctrine in the church. 
There, they joined other primates from Africa and Asia who were in- 
creasingly angered at what they saw as the growing liberalism of Western 
Anglicanism. By the late 199os, the issue of same-sex marriage and the 
ordination of openly gay priests was becoming a major point of contention 
between orthodox Anglicans and church liberals. 
Liberals, led by the ECUSA bishop, Frank Griswold, endorse a more 
open acceptance of homosexual practices. The traditionalists, represented 
strongly by churches in Africa and Asia, condemn homosexuality, and its 
acceptance, as incompatible with the authority and teachings of the Bible. 
At Lambeth, bishops from Africa and Asia formed the majority of the 
votes in the passage of a statement (Jenkins 2002) condemning the 'evils of 
homosexuality and the impossibility of reconciling homosexual conduct 
with Christian ministry'. Prior to the 5 August vote, Kolini joined eight 
other archbishops from Africa, Australia, Asia and South America in 
an open letter to the conference urging support for the statement. Its 
subsequent passage was sternly condemned by the North American 
church hierarchies. Griswold (Jenkins 2002) labelled it 'dangerous funda- 
mentalism'. 
While the issue threatens to create a permanent rift between the Western 
Anglican churches and what is commonly called the more orthodox 
'Global South' churches, the denunciation of homosexuality was wel- 
comed by numerous conservative, rank-and-file Episcopalians in America 
who increasingly found themselves at odds with their more liberal over- 
seers. On 29 January 2000, Kolini became a lead figure in the controversy 
when he joined then Archbishop Moses Tay of Southeast Asia in ordain- 
ing two American bishops, Charles Murphy andJohn Rodgers, to serve as 
'missionary bishops', charged with ministering to orthodox congregations 
who felt 'isolated or repressed by liberal leaders' of the Episcopalian 
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Church-USA (Jenkins 2002). While Anglican tradition holds that an 
archbishop is free to ordain anyone he chooses, the bold move was con- 
demned by the archbishop of Canterbury and head of the world-wide 
Anglican Communion, George Carey, who refused to recognise Murphy's 
and Rodgers' ordination. The archbishop of Canada, Michael Peers, de- 
clared (LeBlanc 2000): 'Bishops are not intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
manufactured on one continent and fired into another.' 
Nevertheless, Kolini, joined by the archbishop of Southeast Asia, Datuk 
Yong Ping Chung, ordained four more American bishops in 2001 to pre- 
side over what became the Anglican Mission in the Americas, a 'virtual 
province' of the Anglican Church of Rwanda residing in America with 
Emmanuel Kolini as its archbishop. Jenkins (2002) describes AMIA's 
purpose as being a 'missionary province', charged with the task of leading 
the Episcopal Church 'back to its Biblical foundations and restoring 
traditional teachings' on issues like the ordination of gay clergy and the 
blessing of same-sex marriages. 
AMIA has since grown rapidly, and Kolini presently stands at the 
head of an American jurisdiction in the United States that claims over 
100 churches and an estimated 15,000 members. Kolini and numerous 
Anglican clergy from Africa have remained actively involved, travelling 
frequently in the United States to meet their congregations and speaking 
regularly at AMIA's annual conferences. Additionally, AMIA's numbers 
have grown as the North American church has continued in its perceived 
liberalism. In November 2003, when Gene Robinson was ordained as the 
first openly gay bishop in the Episcopalian Church, the issue again became 
front page news, prompting a new round of American churches to join 
AMIA. The issue continues to remain current among Episcopalians, as 
well as the broader evangelical community, as numerous political debates 
have erupted in America over gay marriage in recent years.9 
Kolini first attracted attention in 1996 when he published a brief article 
in Christianity Today, a leading evangelical periodical. In 'Cheap 
Evangelism', Kolini (1996) endorsed the Anglican commitment o evan- 
gelism but took issue with what he called 'wrongful understandings 
concerning the teaching that the gospel is for all people, regardless of 
their sinfulness'. He claimed to observe 'a weakening in the Christian 
commitment o God's call to transformation, particularly when it comes 
to sinful expressions of sexuality and harmful lifestyle choices'. In that 
spirit, Kolini's role in the Lambeth controversy was born. 
Nor is he alone in his condemnation of homosexual lifestyles. In 
November 2003, the consecration of Robinson elicited a chorus of criticism 
from Anglican leaders across South America and Africa. The NJew York 
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Times (Lacey & Goodstein 2003) noted that opposition to homosexuality 
was most vociferous in Africa, where 'gays remain closeted and popular 
sentiment regards same-sex relationships as a vice exported from the West'. 
Following Robinson's consecration, Benjamin Nzimbi, archbishop of 
Kenya, declared, 'The Devil has clearly entered our church'. Peter Akinola, 
former archbishop of Nigeria, home to the largest Anglican population in 
the world, has equated homosexuals with pigs and dogs. Political eaders 
have weighed in as well. In January 2oo6, Nigerian President Olusegun 
Obasanjo (Bigabo 2006) told a conference of Nigerian bishops, 'Such a 
tendency [homosexuality] is clearly un-Biblical, unnatural and definitely 
un-African.' 
Statements and declarations such as these often lead Western evange- 
licals to believe that African society is either inherently anti-gay or else that 
African Christians are particularly literalistic ntheir interpretation of the 
Bible. However, African views on same-sex relations must be understood 
against the historical backdrop of African sexuality. Marc Epprecht (200oo4: 
224) demonstrates that same-sex sexuality was known in pre-modern 
Africa, yet homosexuality 'as an identity or an exclusive life choice did 
not exist when the pressures to have sex for reproduction were so over- 
determined by material, political, spiritual or other cultural considera- 
tions'. In regard to the perception that contemporary Africans are 
exceptionally hostile to gays, the author argues (ibid.: 225) that 'revulsion 
against same-sex behaviors, acts, relationships and thoughts (that is, 
homophobia) was introduced into the region by European colonialists and 
preachers', and that Africans 'were encouraged through these discourses 
to equate homophobic constructions ofsexuality, sensuality, and gender 
with civilization and progress'.10 
For his part, Kolini has made his message more palatable to American 
evangelicals by avoiding bombastic public statements, such as Nzimbi 
and Akinola have made. In interviews and press statements, Kolini has 
emphasised that the issue is one of scripture, rather than sexuality. In 
September, 2003, Kolini (BBC 2003) claimed, 'we denounce and declare 
that the Episcopal Church of USA has departed from the doctrine, disci- 
pline and worship of Christ'. In August 2004, Kolini (Blake 2004) noted 
that the Episcopal Church's argument was that 'it's about interpretation 
of the Bible. We think its culture. You can't impose your culture onto 
other people. To be Christian, there are some fundamentals, some basics 
to our faith. The question is "is homosexuality a sin or not?" If the 
Scripture calls it a sin, then it's a sin.' 
At the heart of Kolini's mission is the claim that what happened in 
Rwanda in 1994 is comparable to the current state of the Episcopalian 
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Church. Kolini and his bishops have often declared that what is happen- 
ing in the American church is tantamount to 'a spiritual genocide of 
the truth'. As early as I997, Kolini (I997) expressed his belief that 'there 
is not one, but two genocides - a physical genocide and a spiritual geno- 
cide. Spiritual genocide refers to the presence of sin in people's hearts.' In 
January 2005, Kolini's former provincial secretary and bishop of Kibungo 
Diocese, Josias Sendegeya (Townsend 2005), claimed, 'The Rwandan 
people know what it is to suffer. We experienced genocide and the horror 
that no one in the world came to help us. What has happened in the 
Episcopal Church feels like genocide, too. But it is spiritual rather that 
physical.' 
In effect, the Anglicans in Rwanda have cast their mission as one of 
rescue. In one of his remarks about AMIA at the dedication of the 
Ruhengeri cathedral, Kolini declared: 'Ten years ago, when Rwanda 
cried out to the world for help, no one answered. So when we heard the 
American church crying out for help, we decided to answer.' Indeed, the 
prophecy espoused by the church claims that Rwanda will be a source of 
spiritual renewal for the world.n 
Kolini's message, and the actions of the church in Rwanda, resounds 
loudly with AMIA parishioners, and the association between Rwanda and 
AMIA has paid large dividends for the country. The author's research in 
Rwanda, and at the AMIA Winter Conference in January 2005, confirms 
that the majority of AMIA parishioners, as well as many other evangelicals 
in America, see the Anglican Church's work in Rwanda as utterly genuine 
and along Biblical principles.12 Many of them do indeed see Kolini's 
adoption of their churches as a rescue from theological heresy, and they 
are returning the favour, even while remaining largely unaware of 
Rwanda's history or PEER's relationship to the RPF. 
Numerous AMIA congregations give large sums of money for devel- 
opment in Rwanda, in addition to the substantial ecclesiastical contribu- 
tions that AMIA makes to its new home province. AMIA congregations 
routinely undertake mission trips to Rwanda to take part in development 
projects. The cathedral at Rugenheri is one such example. Currently un- 
der way is the new Kigali Episcopal Theological College, supported by 
and financed in large part by American Anglicans.13 
The support for Rwanda has now gone beyond AMIA. In no small 
measure because of Kolini, Rucyhana and their AMIA supporters, 
Rwanda has drawn the attention of evangelical 'mega-churches' in 
America, notably Rick Warren, pastor of the Saddleback Church in 
California and author of the best-selling The Purpose Driven Church and The 
Purpose Driven Life. Warren, whose books have sold more then 26 million 
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copies since 2003, is one of the most recognised figures among American 
evangelicals. In the summer of 2005, Warren and several other 'mega- 
church' pastors travelled to Rwanda and met Kagame and Rwandan 
church leaders to outline their plan to mobilise American churches to 
address the problems of poverty and disease in Africa. At a gathering 
of 9,000 Rwandan Christians, Warren (Morgan 2005) pledged to make 
Rwanda the first 'purpose driven nation', an initiative to 'harness busi- 
nesspeople, politicians and pastors against the nation's biggest social pro- 
blems'. 
The purpose of this article is not to question the value of such con- 
tributions or the beliefs and faith of Kolini and his followers. Rather, the 
suggestion here is that PEER, acting in cooperation with the RPF, has 
been very skilled in forging an international liance with American 
church congregants who knew little or nothing of Rwanda's history or the 
genocide prior to finding themselves in a defacto Rwandan church. In this, 
the Anglican Church supports a campaign by the RPF to present a mis- 
leading narrative of Rwanda's history, a narrative that uses language, 
identity and an idealised version of the past to support its monopolisation 
of political power. 
THE MISREPRESENTATION OF HISTORY AND POLITICS 
Regardless of the personal sincerity of PEER's clergymen and their AMIA 
partners, reconciliation and recovery must take place in the context of a 
thorough and unbiased understanding of Rwanda's history. As Mamdani 
(2001) notes, the identification f perpetrator and survivor iscontingent on 
one's historical perspective, and thus it is not possible to think of rec- 
onciliation between Hutu and Tutsi without a prior reconciliation with 
history. Without a fair and accurate understanding of the past, any efforts 
toward reconciliation and development will have the effect of supporting 
the ruling Tutsi and RPF oligarchy, hindering any progress on genuine 
political reform. Thus, the conflict will continue to simmer until the op- 
ponents of the regime can regroup for the next round. In 2004, Filip 
Reyntjens (2004) documented a number of political movements, made up 
of both Hutus and Tutsis, which had formed either in exile or clandesti- 
nely to oppose Kagame's regime, including the Forces Democratiques pour 
la Liberation duRwanda (FDLR) which claimed to have 20,000 troops in 
Congo that could be engaged against he regime. 
On one level, the church recognises its own role in Rwanda's history. 
In 2004, Kolini, who himself had no role in either the genocide or the RPF 
invasion, admitted that the church must seek forgiveness. He stated 
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(Morgan 2004a), 'The failure of the church in the genocide is an oppor- 
tunity for the church to cleanse itself and ask for forgiveness.' In other 
ways as well, PEER recognises the power of history, symbolism and 
language, at least in its own messages. In a keynote sermon at the Ruhengeri 
crusade, Rucyahana proclaimed a common theme heard throughout the 
week. He extolled, 'It is not the blood of Hutu or the blood of Tutsi that 
will make you free, but the blood of Jesus!'14 By invoking the graphic 
imagery of blood, Rucyahana reminded the audience of Rwanda's violent 
past while, at the same time, urging reconciliation i the name of Christ. 
Moreover, in the programme guide for the Ruhengeri Crusade, as well 
as in conversations with the author, the church and its clergymen avoided 
categorising genocide victims as 'Hutu Moderates and Tutsis', as is often 
done elsewhere. Nigel Eltringham (20oo4: 76) warned of such constructions 
in Accounting forHorror. Reference to Hutus victimised by the genocide as 
'moderates' implies that all Hutus who survived are extremists, culpable 
to some degree in the killings. He wrote that depicting 'moderate Hutus' 
as 'an "extinct category" contributes to a portrayal of contemporary 
Rwanda according to a crude, binary framework, composed only of" victim- 
rescapf-Tutsi" and "perpetrator-ginocidaire-Hutu ". This binary segmen- 
tation echoes the imagined Manichean construction of Rwandan society 
found in genocidal propaganda.' 
At the crusade, church leaders referred to a Rwandan society inhabited 
by people of different categories, among them 'genocide survivors, geno- 
cide perpetrators, and those indifferent'. No mention was made of 'Hutu 
moderates' or 'Tutsi survivors'. In several conversations with the author, 
Anglican pastors also avoided making such references.15 Yet, even here, 
the church adopts a genocidal framework from which to characterise 
Rwandan society, carrying the implication that the genocide produces the 
only correct categories for identification a d reference (Mamdani 2001). 
The most common way in which PEER supports the RPF's misrep- 
resentation of Rwanda is in their insistence that the distinction between 
Hutu and Tutsi is no longer relevant. Only after the author pressed the 
issue, did PEER clergymen admit to being Tutsi. In general, they claim 
that there are no longer any Hutus or Tutsis, only Rwandans, a practice 
supported by the government in Kigali and observed by the author else- 
where among contemporary Rwandans. Nathan Amooti explained that 
the classification system was a false European construct. He claimed that, 
apart from the old Belgian identification system, 'Rwandans don't know 
who is who until they talk about their fathers and grandfathers.'16 Similar 
statements have routinely been made by others to this author and to the 
wider AMIA community as well. 
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While the avoidance of classifying Rwandans as 'Hutus' or 'Tutsis' 
seems laudable on the surface, the further claim that ethnicity was a 
European invention supports Johan Pottier's argument (2002) that the 
RPF and its sympathisers, such as PEER, have waged an extensive cam- 
paign to popularise misinformation about pre-colonial Rwanda, re-write 
history and make the world believe that ethnicity was and is a non-issue 
in RPF ranks. Both Jan Vansina (2004) and Catherine Newbury (1988), 
among others, have made a compelling case that the distinction between 
'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' was firmly established in the nineteenth-century, 
during the reign of King Rwabugiri. Pottier (2002) makes the point that 
the portrayal of Rwanda's ethnic divisions as a European invention creates 
a 'smoke-screen of sameness' that leads amateur observers of the country 
to read too much into the fact that Rwandans speak the same language, 
have the same religion and inhabit he same space. 
The projection of a Rwanda that was ethnically harmonious before the 
European arrival serves two functions that play well with Western church 
audiences, Rwanda's AMIA supporters among them. First, blaming the 
Hutu-Tutsi division on the Europeans exacerbates the culture of guilt that 
exists in the West for not only failing to stop the genocide but ultimately 
being responsible for creating the very conditions that caused it. The fre- 
quent statements of Kolini and other PEER officials that their 'rescue' of 
American Anglicanism was born out of the West's failure to rescue 
Rwanda in 1994 serves this point explicitly. Second, as Pottier (2002) notes, 
this misleading depiction of Rwanda's history gives people unfamiliar with 
the country the false sense that 'the clock can easily be turned back to 
those harmonious times' when the Tutsi elites benevolently ran the 
country. In that light, the Tutsi elites who are presently in power can easily 
be seen as long-suffering Rwandans who are simply re-building a once 
harmonious and united country. Lost in the culture of sympathy sur- 
rounding the Tutsi exiles is Mamdani's (2001) observation that it was 
the initial RPF invasion of i99o that gave the proponents of' Hutu Power' 
the opportunity to raise the spectre of 'Tutsi Power' returning to subju- 
gate the populace. 
A case in point of PEER's support for the RPF's campaign is its 
embrace of what Pottier (2002) calls the ' o-cows thesis'. To explain the 
origins of the European classification system while obfuscating the fixed 
nature of the nineteenth-century Tutsi oligarchy, the RPF's spokespersons 
have resorted to the claim that 'Tutsi' was solely an economic term that 
meant 'one who owns ten or more cows', and that the Europeans racia- 
lised what was merely a question of economics. At the AMIA Winter 
Conference in 2005, the author observed a representative of PEER 
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explain the 'io-cows thesis' to a large audience of American attendees. No 
one challenged the claim. Pottier argues that the Io-cows sound-bite is an 
exceptionally effective way to convey to the world that the RPF is above 
ethnicity, while abundant evidence demonstrates that such is not the case. 
Eugenia Zorbas (2004) argues that the RPF's suppression of ethnic 
identification, a policy supported by PEER, serves to mask the prominence 
of Tutsi returnees and former RPF members' dominance of Rwandan 
government and society. She quotes Gerard Prunier who has said that 
Rwandan political power is presently in the hands of a few key men who 
grew up as refugees in Uganda, and who are former RPF officers who 
maintain close business and political ties within a circle of civilian friends, 
family and associates who monopolise all key posts in the country. 
Prunier (1995) himself quotes Jean-Damascene Ntakirumana, a former 
Hutu member of the transitional government who defected in 1995- 
Ntakirumana claims, with first-hand insight, 'The RPF denies that there is 
any ethnic problem today with the same energy it used in denouncing the 
ethnic imbalance of the old regime ... the RPF has simply installed a new 
form of Tutsi power.' Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (2002), director of studies at 
the South African Institute of International Affairs, supports the assertion, 
claiming that Kagame's government enjoys support and legitimacy 
'among the new elite, many of whom are returnees. That support is evi- 
dent among certain elements of the church as well.' She further observes 
that 'the perception that a small elite, primarily made up of Tutsis from 
Uganda, runs the country has alienated some segments of the population'. 
The Economist (2004) described Rwanda as a 'thinly-disguised autocracy, 
where dissidents, who are usually accused of genocidal tendencies, live in 
fear, or exile, or both', and that serious domestic opposition or free speech 
is not tolerated. 
The RPF's misrepresentation of Rwanda's history, carried out in collusion 
with PEER, has allowed the country to benefit richly from its embrace of 
American evangelicals, without having attention called to any programme 
of real political reform. AMIA pastors, congregants and other evangelical 
supporters frequently travel in Rwanda under the guidance of PEER, to 
observe various social projects to which they can lend their support and 
resources. In so doing, they are subjected to an idealised portrayal of 
contemporary Rwanda's history and political culture. When questioned, 
a convenient, albeit misleading, narrative is offered that presents the 
following: the RPF were suffering refugees who returned to end the 
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genocide, a genocide ultimately caused by the Europeans and then 
ignored when it happened; the RPF, headed by Kagame, is above ethnicity 
and rules Rwanda strongly only for the purpose of rebuilding a country 
dishevelled by the West; the Anglican Church is above it all and seeks only 
Rwanda's development and recovery. 
The problems with this narrative are either unknown or ignored by 
Rwanda's AMIA supporters and the wider evangelical community in 
America. Otunnu (i999b) demonstrates that he RPA's invasion of Rwanda 
was calculated and well planned, fuelled by the commencement of the 
genocide but originally timed by the citizenship crisis in Uganda. More- 
over, far from being an organisation bereft of ethnic identity, the RPF is 
thoroughly Tutsi, as is PEER, and obfuscates its identity by blaming eth- 
nicity on colonialism and presenting a 'new Rwanda' in which there is no 
Tutsi or Hutu. American supporters are thus blinded both to the divisions 
that still plague Rwanda and the region, and to the elitist nature of its 
rulers. 
Kagame himself is seen as a visionary leader at best and a benevolent 
dictator at worst who is ushering Rwanda down the path of reconciliation. 
Especially troubling is Rick Warren's recent proclamation (Mugabe 2006) 
that Kagame is a 'man who does what is right; he is a great leader 
who will save Rwanda. He stopped the genocide and thereafter installed 
reconciliation; he is a servant leader.' Initially, Kagame offered the 
promise of an inclusive government that would honour the 1994 Arusha 
Accords, which promised a multi-party and multi-ethnic constitution. In
that spirit, Kagame offered positions to former Hutus who opposed the 
Habyarimana regime. Among their number were Pasteur Bizimungu, first 
president of the transitional government, Pierre-Cilestin Rwigyema, se- 
cond prime minister, and Seth Sendashonga, first minister of the interior. 
However, by 2001, Bizimungu was under house arrest, Rwigyema was in 
exile and Sendashonga had been assassinated in Nairobi. Even Joseph 
Sebarenzi, Speaker of the National Assembly and an outspoken voice for 
the Tutsi survivor community, was in exile (Waugh 2004). 
By 2002, the RPF's initial embrace of ethnic and political plurality in 
government was a fagade. Kagame's government has since stifled political 
opposition and governs as a virtual dictatorship, unopposed by the 
Rwandan church community or any other civic body. Timothy Longman 
(1999: 354) observes that in post-genocide Rwanda, 'the RPF-dominated 
government has been careful to prevent an independent civil society from 
re-emerging. The government has actively sought to place its allies in 
charge of all important social organizations. The government has even 
intervened in the selection of church leaders.' 
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As to Rwanda's church leaders, specifically PEER, their close association 
with and support of the RPF, dating back to their own origins in Uganda, 
have made them a politicised church along the same lines as the Catholic 
and Protestant Churches under both Kayibanda and Habyarimana. They 
support the post-genocide narrative offered by the RPF, and have been 
enlisted in the campaign to re-write Rwanda's history. While their efforts 
to promote reconciliation have brought many resources and much attention 
to the country, and while they may be utterly genuine in their own efforts, 
they have become complicit in presenting the RPF's version of Rwanda's 
history and politics. As a result, to paraphrase Pottier (2002), AMIA has 
joined the ranks of numerous groups in the 'aid industry' that prefer to 
accept the authorities' easy reading of a highly complex situation, and 
have actively reproduced and spread, wittingly or unwittingly, a vision of 
Rwanda that bears the RPF's seal of approval. Forgotten is Lemarchand's 
(1998) warning that 'there can be no reconciliation without justice and no 
justice without ruth'. 
NOTES 
i. The research for this article, conducted by the author in Rwanda in 2004, comes from notes and 
observations made in Kigali and Ruhengeri and from numerous conversations both during and since 
with Rwandan clergy and AMIA pastors in the United States. The author also attended the Anglican 
Mission in America National Conference in Myrtle Beach, SC inJanuary 2005. 
2. Belgium's actions were reinforced by the 'Hamitic hypothesis', which held that because agri- 
culture was the natural occupation of the Negro, cattle-owning Africans, like the Tutsi rulers of 
Rwanda, were the descendants of Noah's son, Ham, from the Biblical Genesis story, and therefore 
a culturally superior race meant to rule the inferior agriculturalists, such as the Hutu. 
3. In their quest to gain political acceptance, some Banyarwanda supported Idi Amin in his over- 
throw of Obote. Others, however, Rwigyema and Kagame among them, were recruited by Museveni 
in his 'bush war' against Obote II following the rigged 1980 election. Rwigyema and Kagame were 
among the 27 NRA guerrillas who began the war against Obote in 1981. 
4. Waugh (2004) also notes that Uganda's legislative body, the National Ruling Council, was 
seeking to bar Tutsis from land ownership, adding to what he calls the 'push' factors, in contrast to the 
'pull' factors, in explaining the RPF's invasion of Rwanda. 
5. Author's notes, Ruhengeri, 2004. 
6. The East African Revival of the 1920S had a deep impact on the Church Missionary Society, 
who, operating from Uganda, first planted the Anglican Church in Ruhengeri in 1930, making the 
present Anglican Church a Ugandan product for a second time. 
7. Anglicans in Ruhengeri are the spiritual heirs to the Nyabingi, a cult of female prophetesses whose 
conversion to Christianity helped legitimise the church in northwest Rwanda (Bauer 1977). 
8. The author had several conversations with Amooti both during and since the crusade, con- 
firming that charismatic practices are accepted by the church. 
9. InJanuary 2007, the largest Anglican congregation in North America, Christ Church of Plano, 
TX, left ECUSA to join AMIA. 
IO. See Lindsay & Miescher 2003, a collection of essays that explores the changing definitions and 
understandings of African masculinity. 
II. Author's notes, Ruhengeri, 2004. 
12. Morgan (2004b) extolled Rwanda's gacaca courts as a genuine form of Biblical justice. 
13. Through its network of churches and publications, AMIA has even taken an active role in the 
American marketing of Rwandan coffee. 
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14. Author's notes, Ruhengeri, 2004. 
15. Unfortunately, references to genocide victims as 'Tutsis and Moderate Hutus' are not entirely 
absent. The reference presently appears in a 'Rwanda News Round-up' story by Grace Mugabe 
(2.5.2005) on AMIA's website. The reference is troubling because many AMIA congregants, like 
Americans in general, continue to see the genocide in the dichotomous, binary terms warned about by 
Eltringham. 
16. PEER 2004; author conversations with Pastor Nathan Amooti, Pastor Samuel Mugisha and 
Pastor Augustin Ahimana, 2004. 
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